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THE SPIRIT OF THE NEW FEDERAL RULES
OF PROCEDURE AND PROCEEDINGS
By HON. ORIE L. PHILLIPS, U.S.C.C.A., Denver
(Talk before Denver Bar Association, Dec. 5, 1938)

HE Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 provided respecting
the time for seeking review by the Supreme Court "and
writs of error shall not be brought but within 5 years
after rendering or passing the judgment or decree complained
of." Time has indeed marched on since the adoption of that
important act. The automobile has succeeded the ox-cart.
Speedy self-propelled luxuriant liners and China Clippers
have succeeded slow moving sailing vessels which depended on
a vagaristic weather god who might decree wind or calm.
Airplane and streamline train have succeeded pony express
and stage coach. Telephone, telegraph, and radio encompass
the globe. And with these tremendous strides in the means
of travel and communication has come an increasing demand
for a more expeditious, a more certain, and a more competent
administration of justice. I sometimes ponder whether the
instrumentalities with which we so speedily carry on our
business and social intercourse today have any real advantage
over the simple means afforded our forefathers. Be that as
it may, we are living in an age that demands a speedy administration of justice.
Sensible to this demand, the American Bar Association
more than thirty years ago took up the task of securing the
enactment of a law by Congress giving to the Supreme Court
the power to formulate and promulgate rules of practice and
procedure in the district courts of the United States.
For many years its efforts were blocked by a ranking
member of the Senate Judiciary Committee until the attainment of the objective seemed almost hopeless. Then a fortuitous event occurred. Honorable Homer Cummings became
Attorney General in place of Senator Walsh who had been
selected for the position and who had been a bitter opponent
of the proposed measure. Attorney General Cummings sponsored and secured the adoption and approval of the act of
June 19, 1934, authorizing the Supreme Court to prescribe
rules of practice and procedure in civil actions and to unite
rules at law and in equity so as to secure one form of civil
action and procedure.
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With the aid of an able advisory committee the Supreme
Court has formulated and promulgated these rules and they
are now effective.
It is my considered judgment that no greater achievement has yet been attained in our efforts which should always
be constant to improve and make more certain and expeditious the administration of justice in our courts.
But mere rules are of little help. Unless they are administered by a competent, fearless, honest, and just judiciary,
aided by lawyers with the same attributes who are mindful
of their responsibilities as officers of the court, and of their
duty to society as well as their obligation to their client.
To some phases of these new rules I want to address
myself today.
First, they govern actions at law and suits in equity
and they are to be construed "to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."
Actions are commenced by the filing of a complaint.
The pleadings allowed are a complaint, answer, a reply if
the answer contains a counterclaim, an answer to a crossclaim, a third party complaint, a third party answer, and if
ordered by the court a reply to an answer or a third party
answer.
Pleadings are to be simple, concise, and direct. Demurrers are abolished. The following defenses only may be made
by motion:
1. Lack of jurisdiction over subject-matter;
2. Lack of jurisdiction over the person;
3. Improper venue;
4. Insufficiency of process;
5. Insufficiency of service of process; and
6. Failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted.
Motions for a more definite statement or a bill of particulars and to strike redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter are allowed.
Liberal provisions are made for counterclaims and crossbills and for the bringing in of third parties to the end that
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all questions relating to the subject-matter of the action may
be settled in one suit.
Liberal provisions are also made for amendments and
supplemental pleadings.
No doubt, one of the most important provisions looking to expedition in the disposition of cases is found in Rule
16 dealing with pre-trial procedure. Under it the court may
call the parties before it for a conference to consider
1. The simplification of the issues;
2. The necessity or desirability of amendments to the
pleadings;
3. The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact
and of documents which will avoid unnecessary proof;
4. The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
5. The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues
to a master for findings to be used as evidence when the trial
is to be by jury;
6. Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of
the action.
The rules requires that at the conclusion of the conference the court shall make an order which recites the action
taken thereat, the amendments allowed, and the agreements
made, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel. At the
trial the court may modify such order to prevent manifest
injustice.
Actual experience with this practice in the state courts
at Detroit, Boston, Cleveland, and Los Angeles has demonstrated its practicality and its desirability.
Another important rule looking to the doing of full
and complete justice respecting the subject-matter of the litigation is that dealing with permissive joinder. It reads:
"(a) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one
action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly,
severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all
of them will arise in the action. All persons may be joined
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in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in
respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of
law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action. A
plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or
defending against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be
given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more demendants
according to their respective liabilities.
"(b) Separate Trials. The court may make such
orders as will prevent a party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of a party against
whom he asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against
him, and may order separate trials or make other orders to
prevent delay or prejudice."
Rule 23 is a substantial restatement of Equity Rule 38
as it has been construed by the courts respecting class actions.
Rules 26 to 32 prescribe a much needed plain and simple
procedure for the prompt taking of depositions.
Rules 33 and 34 provide for interrogatories to parties
and for discovery and the production of documents and things
for inspection, copying, or photographing.
Rule 35 provides for physical and mental examinations
of parties for good cause shown under order of court.
Rule 36 provides:
"(a) Request for Admission. At any time after the
pleadings are closed, a party may serve upon any other party
a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any relevant document described in and exhibited
with the request or of the truth of any relevant matters of
fact set forth therein. Copies of the documents shall be de,
livered with the request unless copies have already been furnished. Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period
designated in the request, not less than 10 days after service
thereof or within such further time as the court may allow on
motion and notice, the party to whom the request is directed
serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn state-
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ment either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why
he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
Effect of Admission. Any admission made by
"(b)
a party pursuant to such request is for the purpose of the
pending action only and neither constitutes an admission by
him for any other purpose nor may be used against him in
any other proceedings."
Rule 37 provides:
"(a) Refusal to Answer. If a party or other deponent
refuses to answer any question propounded upon oral examination, the examination shall be completed on other matters
or adjourned, as the proponent of the question may prefer.
Thereafter, on reasonable notice to all persons affected thereby,
he may apply to the court in the district where the deposition
is taken for an order compelling an answer. Upon the refusal
of a deponent to answer any interrogatory submitted under
Rule 31 or upon the refusal of a party to answer any interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, the proponent of the question may on like notice make like application for such an
order. If the motion is granted and if the court finds that
the refusal was without substantial justification the court
shall require the refusing party or deponent and the party or
attorney advising the refusal or either of them to pay to the
examining party the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including reasonable attorney's
fees. If the motion is denied and if the court finds that the
motion was made without substantial justification, the court
shall require the examining party or the attorney advising the
motion or both of them to pay to the refusing party or witness the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees."
Thus, it will be seen that adequate and workable machinery is provided for -the elimination of all issues respecting
which there is no substantial dispute.
This procedure if followed will simplify and silhouette
issues, make their presentation more simple and clear
real
the
to court or jury, save much time at the trial, and make more
speedy and certain the attainment of a just result and the
accomplishment of full and complete justice.
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If time permits, I would like to discuss briefly some features of the rules relating to appellate procedure.
Appeals to the Circuit Court of Appeals are taken by
filing with the District Court a notice of appeal.
The notice must specify the parties taking the appeal,
designate the judgment or part thereof appealed from, and
name the court to which the appeal is taken.
Notice of the appeal is given by mailing copies of the
notice to all parties to the judgment other than those taking
the appeal.
Promptly after taking the appeal the appellant must
serve upon the appellee and file with the District Court a designation of the portions of the record, proceedings and evidence to be contained in the record on appeal. If he does not
designate the complete record and all the proceedings and evidence, he must serve with his designation a concise statement
of the points on which he intends to rely on the appeal.
Within ten days thereafter the appellee may file and serve a
designation of additional portions of the record, proceedings
and evidence to be included. Rule 75 admonishes that all
matter not essential to the decision of the questions presented
by the appeal shall be omitted; that formal parts of exhibits
shall be omitted; that only one copy of any document shall
be included; and that documents shall be abridged by omitting
all irrelevant and formal portions thereof.
Instead of serving designations as above provided the
parties may by written stipulation filed with the clerk of the
District Court designate the parts of the record, proceedings
and evidence to be included in the record.
The clerk of the District Court is required to transmit
to the Court of Appeals under his hand and seal a correct
copy of the matter designated or stipulated. He must include, whether designated or not, copies of the material pleadings without unnecessary duplication, the verdict or findings
of fact and conclusions of law, the master's report where
reference has been made, the opinion, the judgment, and the
notice of appeal with the date of filing thereof, the designations or stipulation of the parties as to the matter to be included in the record, and any statement by the appellant of

DICTA

the points on which he intends to rely. The matter so certified constitutes the record on appeal.
It is not necessary that the record be approved by the
trial court, but if any difference arises between the parties it
shall be submitted to and settled by the trial court.
If material matter is omitted or misstated, the parties by
stipulation, or the trial court or the appellate court on a proper
suggestion or on its own motion may direct correction of the
misstatement or the inclusion of the matter omitted.
When the questions to be presented by appeal can be determined without examination of all the pleadings, evidence
and proceedings in the court below, the parties may prepare
and sign a statement of the case showing how the questions
arose and were decided in the District Court and setting forth
only so many of the facts averred and proved or sought to be
proved as are essential to a decision of the questions to be
presented. The statement shall include a copy of the judgment, a copy of the notice of appeal with its filing date, and
a concise statement of the points to be relied on by the appellant. If the statement conforms to proof, it together with
such additions as the court may consider necessary to present
fully the questions raised by the appeal shall be approved by
the District Court and then filed as the record on appeal.
I now turn to the new rules of the Circuit Court of
Appeals.
When the record is filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals
the appellant must file with the clerk a definite statement of
the points on which he intends to rely and the parts of the
record he deems necessary to a determination thereof with
proof of service thereof on the appellee. The appellee must
within ten days thereafter file with the clerk a designation of
additional parts of the record he deems material. The parts
so designated are then printed under the supervision of the
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Appeals. This permits abandonment of points found to be without foundation and elimination from the printed record of all matter not essential to
a decision of the questions to be presented.
It is my personal view that under this rule new points
may also be presented and application made by either party
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for inclusion in the record of any omitted matter essential to
a consideration of the new points. Frequently considered
study of the record discloses new points or that points specified are without foundation. The whole purpose is to include all that is essential and to eliminate all that is immaterial and nonessential. Noncompliance with the spirit of
this rule subjects the infringing party to the assessment of
costs.
May I suggest that you give careful study to these new
rules and make use of them, not for the purpose of gaining
delay or technical advantage of your adversary, but as instrumentalities for the attainment of justice, as means to bring
all questions relating to the subject matter of the action and
all parties interested therein before the court, to cause all uncontroverted issues to stand as admitted, to eliminate all immaterial issues, and to cause the real and substantial issues to
be presented simply, clearly and directly to the end that full,
complete, exact and speedy justice shall be attained, for in the
words of that great American statesman and lawyer, Daniel
Webster:
"Justice, sir, is the great interest of man on earth. It is
the ligament which holds civilized beings and civilized nations
together. Wherever her temple stands, and so long as it is
duly honored, there is a foundation for social security, general happiness, and the improvement and progress of our race.
And whoever labors on this edifice with usefulness and distinction, whoever clears its foundations, strengthens its pillars, adorns its entablatures, or contributes to raise its august
dome still higher in the skies, connects himself, in name, and
fame, and character, with that which is and must be as durable as the fame of human society."
You and I can contribute to the attainment of this high
ideal so beautifully phrased by Mr. Webster, if in keeping
with the true spirit and intent of these new rules we earnestly
endeavor to use them as instruments to improve and make
more certain and expeditious the administration of justice in
our federal courts.

CHANGE OF VENUE IN ACTIONS INVOLVING
PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS
By ROYAL C. RUBRIGHT, of the Denver Bar.
HE scene opens on a bright and cheery morning in November. We have dispatched a summons to one of the
far corners of the state and have filed a carefully prepared complaint, unassailable in its perfectly stated cause of
action. We glow with the warm satisfaction of work well
done. Confidently we review our allegations and positive
are we that no "weasel" motions or demurrers can upset it.
Time passes and in the mail we receive a neat and pithy
warning that all is not well. It seems that the defendant,
residing in the remote county does not wish to have his attorney travel to the far-off big city every time he wishes to
argue a motion in the case. The defendant has embodied his
objection in the form of a motion for a change of venue. We
have gloomy visions of long, cold trips to the uttermost part
of the state, and almost feverishly we reach for our Code.
We find Section 29, ('35 C. S. A. Ch. 2, Sec. 29) which is
straightforward English:
"In all other cases the action shall be tried in the county
in which the defendants, or any of them, may reside at the
commencement of the action. .

.

. Actions upon contracts

may be tried in the county in which the contract was to be
performed.
"
Where the action involves a contract which is specifically and definitely to be performed in a certain county, the
problem is simple: see for example, Grimes Co., Inc. vs. Nelson, 94 C. 487, 31 P. (2d) 488 (1934); Lamar Alfalfa
Milling Co. vs. Bishop, 80 C. 369, 250 P. 689 (1927);
Coulter vs. The Bank of Clear Creek, 18 C. A. 444, 72 P.
602 (1903).
Our case, however, involves a suit on a contract in
which there is no place specified for the defendant to perform.
We feel that we ought to look at a few cases so we reach
for Progressive Mutual Insurance Co. vs. Mihoover, 87 C.
64, 284 P. 1025 (1930), and find that the plaintiff may sue
where he resides even though defendant resides and was served
in another county. The court finds expressly that:
"Where the contract is silent as to the place of payment,
the debtor is obliged to seek the creditor in the county of his
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residence and at his usual place of business or abode, and make
payment to him there."
The net result was that the plaintiff tried the case in his
own county.
Well! We have solved that problem. But--our eye
falls on Kimberlin vs. Rutliff, 93 C. 99, 23 P. (2d) 583
(1933). Here the court finds that:
"The contract is silent as to the place of performance.
In that situation the code provision relative to the right of
trial in the county where the contract is to be performed is
not applicable. Such provision has reference to contracts
which by their terms are to be performed at a particular
place."
The result here is that the defendant is entitled to have
the case tried where he resides and was served.
With visions of numberless trips to the remote county,
we really settle down to careful search of all the cases. After
several hours, we find the score to be seven to six in favor of
the view announced in Kimberlin vs. Rutliff, 93 C. 99, 23 P.
Incredulous, we re-read our cases and
(2d) 583 (1933).
finally desperately admit that there is a definitely and sharply
divided split of authority in Colorado.
The cases of People ex rel. Columbine Mercantile Co.
vs. DistrictCourt, 70 C. 540, 203 P. 268 (1922); Chutkow
vs. Wagman Realty and Insurance Company, 80 C. 11, 248
P. 1014 (1926); Progressive Mutual Insurance Co. vs. Mihoover, 87 C. 64, 284 P. 1025 (1930); Gould vs. Mathes,
55 C. 384, 135 P. 780 (1913); Board of Commissioners of
Montezuma County vs. Board of Commissioners of San
Miguel County, 3 C. A. 137, 32 P. 346 (1893); and dictum
in Enyart vs. Orr, 78 C. 6, 238 P. 29 (1925); (we omit
Bean vs. Gregg, 7 C. 499, 4 P. 903 (1884) because the Code
of 1883 differs from its present form), will sustain us in our
now flagging hope of trying our case in our own county.
These cases hold that where a contract does not specifically fix
a place of performance, then the action may be tried where the
plaintiff resides. The decisions are not based squarely on that
ground in all the cases but the final result was that the
plaintiff kept the place of trial in the county where he brought
his action.
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Opposed to these cases and nearly always ignoring
them and their implications are the following: MaxwellChamberlain Motor Co. vs. Piatt, 65 C. 140, 173 P. 867
(1918); People ex rel. Burton vs. District Court, 74 C. 121,
218 P. 1047 (1923); People ex ret. vs. DistrictCourt, 66 C.
330, 182 P. 7 (1919); Kimberlin vs. Rutliff, 93 C. 99, 23 P.
(2d) 583 (1933); Brewer vs. Gordon, 27 C. 111, 59 P.
404 (1899), and People ex rel. vs. County Court, 72 C. 395,
211 P. 102 (1922), which is weak on our point because it
is a note and hence covered specifically in another subdivision
of Section 29; and Smith vs. Post Printing & PublishingCo.,
17 C. A. 238, 68 P. 119 (1902), which is weak on our
point. These cases all hold that as a general proposition the
action must be tried where the defendant resides unless ,it
clearly appears that the contract is to be performed in some
other county. Again, these decisions are not all based squarely
upon this ground. For our purposes, however, they indicate
that the "city-shy" defendant was able to keep the place of
trial in his own county.
Confronted with this inexplicable conflict, we naturally
begin to go back to find some fundamental principle to be
used as a standard.
We gradually become aware that "performance" is a
word that embraces two distinct concepts. We realize that
every contract-involving as it does, at least two partiesclearly contemplates two performances.
The plaintiff is
suing because the defendant has not performed. In our class
of cases, the usual performance is the payment of money.
Viewed in this light, we are forced to concede .that some of
the cases favoring us have ignored the distinction: viz. Gould
vs. Mathes, 55 C. 384, 135 P. 780 (1913); Board of Commissioners of Montezuma County vs. Board of Commissioners of San Miguel County, 3 C. A. 137, 32 P. 346
(1893). We are convinced of the validity of this concept by
Lamar Alfalfa Milling Co. vs. Bishop, 80 C. 369, 250 P. 689
(1927), which carefully distinguishes the two kinds of performance involved in contracts. This theory is also set forth
in People ex rel. Burton vs. District Court, 74 C. 121, 218
P. 1047 (1923); People ex rel. vs. DistrictCourt, 66 C. 330,
182 P. 7 (1919); Brewer vs. Gordon, 27 C. 111, 59 P. 404
(1899), and Smith vs. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 17
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C. A. 238, 68 P. 119 (1902). We are thus forced to abandon the distinction between two kinds of "performance" as
an aid to keeping our case in Denver.
We recall vaguely that only one case has made any definite attempt to reconcile the conflict implicit in the two lines
of authority, or to distinguish the cases: Kimberlin vs. Ruttiff, 93 C. 99, 23 P. (2d) 583 (1933).
The case itself is
contrary to our position because it held the venue must be
laid in the county where defendant resides and was served.
Avidly we seize on the reasoning requiring that the contract
itself must specify the place of performance because the venue
can be changed on that ground. We realize that in Gould vs.
Mathes, 55 C. 384, 135 P. 780 (1913) the contract was not
in writing and hence did not specify the place of performance
and yet the court refused to change the venue to the place of
defendant's residence. Board of Commissioners of Montezuma County vs. Board of Commissioners of San Miguel
County, 3 C. A. 137, 32 P. 346 (1893) is to the same effect.
Also in People ex rel. Columbine Mercantile Co. vs. District
Court, 70 C. 540, 203 P. 268 (1922) the contract was set
out in the complaint in haec verba and in a real sense did not
definitely fix the place of performance; and yet the court did
not require the venue to be changed to where the defendant
resided and was served. We borrow the language of People
ex ret. vs. County Court, 72 C. 395, 211 P. 102 (1922):
"However, though the reason is wrong the decision was
right." We derive some consolation out of the fact that the
only case attempting to harmonize the conflict may be attacked as not decisive because even it ignores several contrary
cases.
As a last resort we hopefully analyze the cases most
strongly in our favor, viz. People ex rel. Columbine Mercantile Co. vs. District Court, 70 C. 540, 203 P. 268 (1922);
Chutkow vs. Wagman Realty and Insurance Company, 80
C. 11, 248 P. 1014 (1926); Progressive Mutual Insurance
Co. vs. Mihoover, 87 C. 64, 284 P. 1025 (1930) and the
dictum in Enyart vs. Orr, 78 C. 6, 238 P. 29 (1925), in the
hope that their original basis will help us reconcile the conflict.
These cases say that the debtor must seek his creditor and
make payment to him, and for that reason the creditor may
sue where he resides. The real basis for those decisions stems
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from statements in R. C. L. and C. J. to the effect that where
no place is expressed for performance of a contract to pay
money, the debtor must seek out the creditor and pay the
creditor where he resided. The text statements are not discussed under a topic involving venue or change of venue.
The Colorado decisions imply that if a debtor must seek his
creditor, and pay him, then there is an implied agreement in
the contract that it is to be performed where the creditor
resides. This reasoning seems to stretch "performance" to
cover a lot of ground in the light of the first sentence of Section 29 of the Code and of the decisions that the action must
be tried where the defendant resides unless the contract itself
clearly fixes a place of performance elsewhere, see e. g. Lamar
Alfalfa Milling Co. vs. Bishop, 80 C. 369, 250 P. 689
(1927); Maxwell-Chamberlain Motor Co. vs. Piatt, 65 C.
140, 173 P. 867 (1918); People ex rel. Burton vs. District
Court, 74 C. 121, 218 P. 1047 (1923); People ex rel. vs.
District Court, 66 C. 330, 182 P. 7 (1919); Kimberlin vs.
Rutliff, 93 C. 99, 23 P. (2d) 583 (1933).
We finally become woefully conscious that "our mistress" is capricious indeed. We still definitely wish to try our
case here but we are hopelessly unable to rationalize our position as the better branch of two conflicting lines of authority.
We prepare to face the court with the strongest cases we have
and let the judge decide. As dusk falls we thoughtfully
wonder how many days away from the office those trips will
require.
A LAWYERS' ORCHESTRA
A unique institution in legal circles is the Lawyers' Club Orchestra
of the Philadelphia Bar (The Shingle, Philadelphia Bar Association,
December, 1938). It is composed entirely of members of the legal profession and started with eighteen men but now has a membership of
thirty-eight and is the only orchestra of its kind in the nation.
MISSING
Volume 10 containing the 12 issues of Dicta for 1933 has been
borrowed from the Editor and, as is usual in such cases, the latter has
received a large number of calls for articles which the index shows are
contained in that particular volume.
Please return it to the Editor's office.
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This issue of Dicta contains the first Section devoted exclusively to
the Colorado Bar Association activities and news items. It is being
distributed to the entire membership of the State Bar of about 1100
members, and is supplied as an additional service to the members of the
Association as a part of your membership without extra charge. Dicta
has already attained national recognition among the profession as one
of the best of monthly legal periodicals. The publication of this additional section should add materially to its value and interest among the
lawyers of Colorado.

MESSAGES AND GREETINGS FROM PRESIDENTS
OF STATE AND LOCAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS
From G. DEXTER BLOUNT, President Colorado Bar
Association

NTIL this issue of DICTA, Colorado Bar Association
never published nor joined in the publication of a journal. It has had no effective means of communicating
regularly with its members.
Shortly after the present administration of the Association took office a committee was appointed, with Mr. Wilbur
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F. Denious as Chairman, to investigate and report upon the
feasibility of the Association rendering such a service toits
members. This committee considered the monthly publication of a periodical by the Association (1) alone, (2) in conjunction with the Rocky Mountain Law Review published
by the Law School of the University of Colorado, (3) as a
part of DICTA, or the use of The Daily Journal of Denver
for official announcements. The committee favored the publication of the journal as a part of DICTA. This decision
was approved by the Board of Governors. Another committee, of which Mr. William E. Hutton was Chairman, then
made arrangements with the officials of Denver Bar Association whereby a section of DICTA will be used as the monthly
periodical of Colorado Bar Association without extra charge
to the members of either Association.
The officials of Colorado Bar Association hope that the
action taken will meet the approval of its members and that
the contents of DICTA will prove to be increasingly interesting, entertaining and informative.
Since the Annual Meeting in Colorado Springs last
September, the officers have been busy constructing the reorganization of the Association in conformity with the
amended By-Laws. Among other accomplishments, in addition to routine work, are the following: The arduous task of
preparing and printing a report of the proceedings of the Annual Meeting has been given primary consideration and, as
a result, the report was printed and distributed to the members in December. The publication of a periodical was provided for, as above stated. The ten standing committees and
about ten special committees were carefully selected and are
performing their duties satisfactorily. Plans have been perfected to attempt to procure legislation at the incoming session of the General Assembly authorizing the Supreme Court
of Colorado to adopt modern rules of practice and procedure
similar to those provided for the United States District
Courts. Details are being worked out for the establishment
of Legal Institutes to be conducted, maybe quarterly, along
practical lines in each Congressional District, and possibly in
each Judicial District, under the leadership of President-Elect
William R. Kelly, and as similar Legal Institutes are being
conducted now with outstanding success in other States.
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Probably the accomplishment most beneficial to individual
members of the Association, particularly those residingelsewhere than in Denver, has been the opening and maintenance
of a Secretary's Office in the Capitol Building in charge of Mr.
Fred Y. Holland, Secretary of the Association. He is not only
ready and willing, but has begun, to render numerous gratuitous services for members in obtaining for them information
readily available in the Supreme Court Library, and elsewhere in the Capitol Building, in response to inquiries by
letter or telephone. During the recent political campaign the
officers, with the approval of the Board of Governors and
the cooperation of some of the affiliated Associations, actively,
vigorously and effectively urged the non-adoption of the constitutional amendment appearing on the ballot as No. 2, sponsored by certain chiropractors and facetiously called the
"Health Freedom Amendment." This was done primarily
for the reason that the proposed amendment to the Constitution of Colorado, if adopted, would have disrupted important
features of the governmental structure of the State and interfered with the licensing and regulation of lawyers and members of other professions.
The President and Secretary have visited four of the
Local Associations where they were delightfully received and
hospitably entertained. They expect to visit elsewhere in the
State during the next few months.
On November 13 the President, President-Elect and Secretary attended an important conference of 29 officials of the
State Bar Associations located in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, where
they received much valuable information with reference to the
promotion of Bar Association activities and the advancement of the best interests of lawyers and the public in improving the administration of justice. The information so obtained should greatly aid the officers of Colorado Bar Association in developing and carrying out their plans for its future.
The officers of the Association are gratified with the fine
spirit of cooperation being shown by the committeemen, the
officers of the affiliated Associations, and generally by the
members of the Association throughout the state.
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From ARCHIBALD A. LEE, President, The Denver
Bar Association
To The Colorado Bar Association, on behalf of The
Denver Bar Association, I extend congratulations on its successful reorganization, and best wishes for a long and vigorous life.
In these days of change and multiplying organizations,
closer co-operation among the members of this ancient profession can and should be made to promote the general welfare. I know that I speak for the full membership in stating that The Denver Bar Association will continue to cooperate generously and cordially for the common benefit.
Further evidence of our participation may be seen in the
arrangements which have been concluded to publish a Colorado Bar section in Dicta, which has attained a high standing in the legal periodical field. This section should add materially to the value of Dicta to all Colorado lawyers.
From LEON H. SNYDER, President El Paso County Bar
Association, Colorado Springs, Colorado
The members of the El Paso County Bar Association
are very much pleased to learn that arrangements have been
made to publish a Colorado Bar Association section in
"Dicta". We feel that this plan of operation is the best possible arrangement which could have been made. If "Dicta"
has lacked anything in the past it will be supplied by the section devoted to the entire Bar of Colorado, and certainly we
who are outside of Denver will gain greatly by having the
benefit of the complete publication.
We look forward to the new edition with interest and
anticipation. The editors have our sincere appreciation and
best wishes. We will be glad to cooperate in every way possible to insure the continued success of the undertaking.
From ALFRED TODD, President Southeastern Colorado Bar
Association, Lamar, Colorado
I am in receipt of your announcement of the forthcoming "Colorado Bar Section" to appear in "Dicta", and I desire most heartily to commend this worthwhile enterprise.
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This will, I believe, prove another step in the direction of
stimulating general interest among attorneys all over the
State in the affairs of our State and local Bar Associations.
The reorganization of our State Association that was effected
this year was a splendid accomplishment for the Bar of Colorado, and your present project would appear to be right in
line with it.
From JAMES M. NOLAND, President Southwestern Colorado
Bar Association, Durango, Colorado
The Colorado Bar Association is to be congratulated
upon the opportunity presented to it for publication of a
regular section in "Dicta". It should prove of great value
in strengthening the new ties which were formed between the
state and local associations at the recent meeting in Colorado
Springs, and I am certain that I bespeak the sentiments of all
our Southwestern Colorado members in assuring you our
heartiest cooperation in this new venture.
From

E. SABIN, President Otero County Bar
Association, La Junta, Colorado
I have your letter of December 2nd, It seems to me that
the publication of news and personal items concerning the
Colorado Bar Association and its members in "Dicta" is a
very good one, and I am sure will ,meet with the approval
and appreciation of the members of the Otero County Bar
Association.
CHARLES

From LEONARD M. HAYNIE, President San Luis Valley Bar
Association, Alamosa, Colorado
The publication of a Colorado Bar Association section
in Dicta is an excellent idea. It will increase the circulation of
a very credible legal publication and add credit and distinction to a revived State Bar Association. San Luis Valley
members will welcome such a plan and wish you well in the
enterprise. May this step ahead, together with the progress
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made by the Association in the past few months, carry on
into the New Year and increase as time passes.
From WILLIAM 0. DESOUCHET, President Boulder County
Bar Association, Boulder, Colorado
Boulder County Bar Association was one of the first of
the local associations to approve the new plan of affiliation
with the state association. One of the inducements cited was
the possibility of a monthly publication in conjunction with
an already established law periodical.
You may consider this an expression of our gratitude
to the officers of the Colorado Bar Association on their industry in bringing our hopes to such an early realization.
Our good wishes and cooperation attend you in your venture,
which we feel is also ours.
From THOMAS J. WARREN, President Larimer County Bar
Association, Fort Collins, Colorado
We think the proposed plan to publish a section devoted
to the Colorado Bar Association, in "Dicta", is admirable.
"Dicta", is a publication of high quality and nationally
recognized. It is most generous of that publication to allow
the Colorado Bar Association space in its pages, and we feel
sure that the publication with the addition of articles and
communications from the various local groups will be enthusiatically received throughout the State, and do much toward
the development of a higher esprit de corps in the State Bar.
From CHARLES C. TOWNSEND, President,The Weld County
Bar Association, Greeley, Colorado
Speaking for our local organization, I am pleased to say
that your plan to have the particular news and personal items
of general interest to the Bar, published in "Dicta" meets
with our approval.
The magazine "Dicta" is a splendid publication in itself
and with the added items of general interest to our Bar Association, it will be much better than a separate publication
confined to our own accomplishments.
I feel certain that this plan will meet with general
approval.
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KANSAS CITY STATE BAR EXECUTIVES'
MEETING
State and Local Bar Associations in the
Middle West are Active
Executives of state bar associations of the Eighth and
the Tenth Federal Circuits met Sunday, November 13, 1938,
at Kansas City, Missouri. Twenty-nine association officers
representing nine states attended the conference.
Call of the meeting was issued by R. Allan Stephens,
secretary of the Illinois Bar Association. The program was
ably led by him, as chairman of the A. B. A. Section of Bar
Organization Activities, Burt J. Thompson of Iowa, chairman of the A. B. A. Committee on Organization and Development of Legal Education, and W. E. Stanley of Kansas,
active on the council of that section. There was brisk interchange in which all participated.
Forms of state bar organization, post admission legal
education, state association activities, younger member activities, books, forms, legal aid, and economic surveys were
canvassed with live interest.
Colorado was represented by President G. Dexter Blount
as its spokesman, Secretary Fred Y. Holland, and Presidentelect William R. Kelly. Much valuable information on making associations useful and of interest to members was
obtained. Not the least were more service to the individual
member, and legal institutes, a development already of marked
success in Iowa, Kansas, and Illinois.
WILLIAM R. KELLY, President-Elect.
A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

Non-Lawyer Applicants Must Take Examination Before

I.C.C.

On August 11, 1938, the Interstate Commerce Commission announced that it had determined that all applicants for admission to
practice before it who were not attorneys at law admitted to practice
before the Supreme Court of the United States or the highest court of
any state shall be admitted only upon written examination, in order
that the applicant may show that he is "possessed of the necessary legal
and technical qualifications to enable him to render valuable service
before the Commission and is otherwise competent to advise and assist
in the presentation of matters before the Commission."

!] Supreme Court Decisions
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EVIDENCE-No.

]

14449-Decided De-

cember 5, 1938--Schwab us. Industrial Commission-District
Court of Weld County-Hon. FredericW. Clark, Judge-Affirmed
-In Department.
HELD:
1. Evidence examined and found to sustain finding of
commission and district court that it was insufficent to prove the physiological or anatomical sequence between injury to kidney and the pain of
which claimant complains.
2. Where the record does not disclose any sale at which claimant
acted as auctioneer, his statement, that he cannot act as auctioneer because
he cannot take a deep breath and therefore, his earning capacity is
diminished, is "hardly convincing."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland, concur.

AUTOMOBILES-NEGLIGENCE-GUEST STATUTE-WILFULNESS AND
WANTONESS-No. 14154-Decided December 5, 1938-Bashor

vs. Bashor, et al.-DistrictCourt of Boulder County-Hon. Frederic W. Clark, Judge-On Rehearing-Originalopinion reversing
judgment adhered to.
HELD:
1. Where it appears that the driver of an automobile,
which was involved in an accident resulting in the death of one of the
occupants and injuries to the others, was on friendly terms with all of
the occupants of the car, that no protest was made by anyone as to the
speed or manner in which he was driving, that there was no evidence
that any one of the passengers felt any apprehension of danger, that
he was engaged in locating a radio station broadcasting a program by
operating the car radio dial which was on the steering wheel post while
he drove with only his left hand, that he was driving at a speed of 45
to 55 miles per hour at 2:00 o'clock in the morning, that he didn't
see the car in front of him until someone in the car directed his attention
to it, that it was then only 50 feet in front of him, that he then swerved
to avoid a collision and lost control of his car, that he could have
avoided the accident had he not negligently withdrawn his attention from
the road to dial the radio, but that there was nothing he could do to
avoid the accident other than what he did do after he became aware
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of the situation, there is not enough to show that the accident resulted
from the driver's "negligence consisting of a wilful and wanton disregard
of the rights of others" as required by the Colorado Automobile Guest
Statute. (Chapter 118 S. L. 1931, Chap. 16, sec. 371, C. S. A. 1935.)
2. Mere unconscious inattention, under such circumstances, and
up to the amount of warning by the passenger in the front seat is not an
omission of such character as to justify a finding that one could not be
guilty of such inattention and at the same time have a natural and normal
concern for the safety of others who might be harmed as a result of it.
It was not wanton.
3. Where the driver states after the accident that he was responsible for it, that it was caused by his recklessness, that he was indifferent
to consequences while engaged in driving the car, in the light of the
undisputed evidence as to what all the parties in the car did and did not
do, such statements are but mere conclusions as to the legal effect of his
conduct and therefore not properly to be taken into consideration as
evidence.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Bouck dissenting. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr. Justice
Holland not participating.
INSURANCE-DEATH BENEFIT CERTIFICATES-DEATH OF INSURED
WHILE VIOLATING CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-DIRECTED
VERDICT-No. 14394-Decided December 5, 1938-International Service Union Association vs. Martinez-District Court of
Denver-Hon. Henry S. Lindsley, Judge-Affirmed-En Banc.
FACTS:
Plaintiff as beneficiary under a death benefit certificate
issued by defendant upon the lives of the members of plaintiff's family,
brought suit to recover on the certificate upon the death of one of the
family. The defense was that the policy did not cover "death occurring
while violating any criminal law," and that the deceased received the
wound from which he died while committing a criminal assault upon
a third party. The decedent had been engaged in an altercation with
a third party, and after separating, a scuffle took place in which another
person picked up the third party's gun and shot. The third person and
his friend were tried for murder and acquitted. The trial court after
hearing all the evidence refused to direct a verdict in this case.
HELD: 1. There was enough evidence to go to the jury upon
which it might have found that the third party was the aggressor or
that even if the decedent was the aggressor the jury might reasonably
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infer in the light of a situation well calculated to induce a reasonable man
so situated to be apprehensive of danger, that in taking the aggressive
he acted in self defense.
2. The acquittal of the third parties of murder is not conclusive
that the decedent was engaged in violating a criminal law so as to deprive
the beneficiary from recovery under the policy.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
LIFE INSURANCE-ASSIGNMENT-No. 14308-Decided December 5,
1938-Rahe us. PrudentialInsurance Company-District Court
of Pueblo County-Hon. William B. Stewart, Judge-ReversedIn Department.
FACTS: Decedent, insured under insurance policy made payable
"to executors or administrators of the insured," wrote and signed an
instrument requesting that the policy be paid to her father (plaintiff).
There was no provision in the policy for assignment. When she died,
plaintiff brought action in the county court asking that the administrator
be adjudged without claim and that the company be ordered to pay him
the proceeds. By stipulation, insurance company paid money into court
and was discharged. The demurrer of the administrator was overruled
and upon trial there was verdict and judgment for plaintiff. On appeal
to the district court, the demurrer was sustained.
HELD: It is immaterial whether the document was an assignment
or an attempt to change beneficiaries. The policy was a chose in action
and subject to all the conditions of such. It was the property of the
insured and no one had any rights therein. The restriction in the policy
as to changing terms without consent of company was for the sole benefit
of the company. No other could take advantage of it.
2. Where the insured names no beneficiary in her policy, except
her legal representatives, the insured was free to do as she pleased with it.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice Holland, concur.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-No. 14365-Decided September 19,
1938-Rogers et al us. Solem et al.-District Court, DenverHon. Otto Bock, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Claimant alleged that he suffered an injury to his right
eye while drilling in a mine, when pieces of steel and rock struck the
eyeball. Later the eye had to be removed. The mine was owned by
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two women who employed L. as their agent in the management of the
property. L. took his instructions from R. who was son of one of
the owners and nephew of the other. R. claimed that he acted only
for his mother although the functions which he performed were equally
as beneficial to the other owner. When apprized of the injury to
claimant, R. gave L. his personal check for $200.00 to be used by L.
for the benefit of claimant in any manner he saw fit. Actually, $150.00
of this sum was expended for claimant's relief. The owners claimed
a leasing arrangement between L. and the claimant.
HELD:
1. The legal relationship of all the parties was such
as to make the owners of the property liable to claimant for compensation under the Act. '35 C. S. A., Vol. 3, C. 97, Sec. 328, C. L.
4423.
2. The purpose of this section of the law is to prevent evasion
of the insurance requirements of the act by leasing.
3.
The payment of the $150.00 was "payment of compensation" within the meaning of Section 363, Chap. 97, supra.
4. Evidence considered and found to be sufficient upon which
to base finding that removal of eye was necessitated by the accident.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Burke, Mr. Justice
Hilliard, and Mr. Justice Holland concur.

PLEADING-REPLICATION-DENIALS-No. 14407-Decided December 5, 1938-Zucerman vs. W. E. Guthner-DistrictCourt of
Denver-Hon. Henry A. Hicks, Judge-Reversed-In Department.
FACTS:
Plaintiff sued in replevin to recover certain automobiles
alleged to belong to him but which the defendant took into his possession
from one, G. The defendant as sheriff, levied upon the chattels and took
them into his custody by authority of an execution issued upon .a judgment against G. Under the assignments of error the decisive question
for determination is whether or not the replication put in issue certain
controlling allegations of the third and separate defense. The replication stated as follows:
Plaintiff denies the allegations contained in paragraph three in said
thid, further and separate defense in the manner and form as therein alleged and set out and plaintiff alleges that said automobiles in question
were delivered to the said Gerick to be sold by the said Gerick as the
property of the plaintiff herein and the proceds from said sale to be
delivered to the plaintiff herein by the said Gerick and that the said Gerick
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would be entitled to a certain commission upon his selling the said automobiles."
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the replication and plaintiff
elected to stand upon his pleading.
HELD: 1. "Under section 62 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
denials must be either general or specific and, further, must be positive
unless in the form of the statutory denial upon information and belief.
The fact that section 77 of the Code provides inter alia, that: 'The replication may be general in terms denying all new matters set up in the
answer,' does not alter the situation where that method of pleading is not
adopted."
2. " 'The denials must, however, be clear and unequivocal. Evasive denials are not sufficient. Hence literal and conjunctive denials, or
denials merely in manner and form, or which fail to deny the averment
in the complaint intended to be controverted in its substance and intent,
are insufficient to raise an issue.' "
3. "Standing alone, therefore, the denial, 'in the manner and
form' merely, does not controvert the allegations,
* * *" but in
"addition to making this ineffective denial, plaintiff in the same paragraph pleads affirmative matter in the nature of avoidance, alleging an
agency, or bailment of the automobiles inconsistent with the situation
disclosed by the allegations" in the paragraph of the answer relied upon
by defendant as forming the basis of the estoppel he seeks to assert.
4. "Such affirmative averments of fact contrary to, or inconsistent
with those alleged in the pleading of the adversary to which they are
directed are equivalent to a denial."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Young concur.

CRIMINAL LAW-RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL-No. 14426-Decided

August 31, 1938t--In re: Harry Schechtel--Original proceeding
for a writ of habeas corpus-Petition for writ denied-In Department.
FACTS: Petitioner, while serving sentence to imprisonment imposed 10-5-35 by Federal District Court had indictment returned
against him by a grand jury in state district court on an alleged offense
distinct from that involved in the federal conviction. The state district attorney requested the warden of the federal reformatory to detain
the petitioner upon completion of the federal sentence, for delivery to
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a Colorado officer, for return to this state for trial on the state indictment. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the state indictment on the
ground that he had been denied the right to a speedy trial of the charges
in it. The motion was dismissed.
HELD:
1. No constitutional right of the petitioner to a speedy
trial was violated by failure of the state to put him- on trial while he
was in the custody of the United States and serving a sentence in her
prisons for a violation of her laws.
2. There is no obligation, under such circumstances, upon the
state's prosecuting authorities to make application to the federal government for the return of a federal prisoner to the state for trial on state
charges.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr. Justice
Young, and Mr. Justice Bakke concur,

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-FARM AND RANCH LABORERS-COMMERCIAL AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISES-No. 14446-Decided
December 12, 1938-Hill, et a[. us. Bunher-District Court of
Saguache-Hon. J. I. Palmer, Judge-Reversed-In Department.
FACTS:
Workmen's compensation case in which the claimant alleges that while employed by defendant in error, as a hay stacker on
July 7, 1937, he was knocked from a stack of hay by a mechanical
stacker and suffered the injuries which form the basis of his claim.
Defendant in error was engaged in the business of farming. When not
occupied on his own premises, he undertook the cutting and stacking
of hay for others for hire. While thus engaged he employs the services
of more than four employees. He did not carry workman's compensation insurance. Hill was one of the men employed by defendant in error.
The question involved is whether Hill, the employee and claimant, was
not a "farm and ranch laborer" and, hence, entitled to compensation.
HELD:
When Bunker, defendant in error, year after year, with
extensive and special equipment, with a crew of 15 or more men set out
to serve the public generally, he engaged in a commercial or business enterprise, distinguished from his own farming operations, and his employees
were not farm laborers within the stautory exception, so as to exempt
him from the provisions of the act.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr. Justice
Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland, concur.
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QUIET TITLE-TAX DEED---NOTICE-No. 14388-Decided October
3, 1938-Brown vs. Davis-DistrictCourt of Logan CountyHon. H. E. Munson, Judge-Reversed.
HELD:
1. Notice preceding the issuance of tax deed (as prescribed by section 255, chapter 142, C. S. A., 1935) although given
to record owner of lots, must also be given to party in actual occupancy or possession of the lots, although the latter is tenant of
record owner--otherwise tax deed is void.
2. It is not for the Supreme Court to determine the necessity
of requiring the tenant to be personally served, in such instances,
where the owner has been personally served-the statute requires it.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke not
Mr. Justice Bouck, dissenting.
participating.

PARENT

AND CHILD-CUSTODY OF CHILDREN-No.

14414-De-

cided October 3, 1938-In re: People ex rel. McChesney vs. McChesney--Juvenile Court of Denver-Hon. Eugene J. Madden,
Jr., Judge-Reversed-En Banc.
1. Where it appears that the District Court in divorce
HELD:
action, upon proper hearing awarded child to father, that child was
being sent to school, that he was provided with suitable and sufficient
clothing, that he was properly fed, it cannot be said that a "controversy" exists as to the custody of the child within the sense in which
such word is used in the dependency statute (Sec. 1, Chap. 33, 1935,
C. S. A.) although the mother objects to father's custody and child
prefers to be with mother.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Hilliard dissents.

EQUITY-RIGHT-OF-WAY-ADVERSE POSSESSION-RATIFICATION OF
CONTRACTS-No. 14420-Decided December 12, 1938-Perry,

et al. vs. Bunten-District Court of Montrose-Hon. Straud M.
Logan, Judge-Affrmed-En Banc.
HELD: No reversible or prejudicial error was found in the above
entitled case wherein an action was brought to restrain plaintiffs in error
from using a strip of land claimed by defendent in error, and from breaking and tearing down gates and fences thereon, and for damages. The
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parties hereto have been neighbors for many years, both deriving title
from the same grantor. Defendant in error claimed to have acquired
a right of way over plaintiffs' in error land by an express agreement which
their father had with plaintiffs' in error grantor, further strengthened
by adverse use which had been continuous, uninterrupted, exclusive, open
and notorious for over 26 years. Also, that after defendant in error
acquired his property he agreed to the prior agreement as to the right-ofway, therefore ratifying the same. As to this latter alleged ratification,
it was held that there was not sufficient consideration to sustain the same.
However, the case was affirmed because of no prejudicial error.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Knous not participating.

MISCELLANA
THE LAW'S DELAY
"About 560 years before Christ. Solon made reference to the slowness of justice; Horace in the year 24 B. C. announced that justice was
still 'moving slowly;' Shakespeare in 1601 had Hamlet include 'the
law's delay' among those things that justified suicide; a third of a century
later George Herbert complained that 'lawsuits consume time,' said Frank
J. Hogan, President of the American Bar Association in a recent address.
"A century passed during which the changes were rung on this
ancient complaint until Bishop Burnet, in his 'History of His Own
Times,' in 1723, set it down that 'the law of England is the greatest
grievance of the nation, very expensive and dilatory.'
"Dickens devoted a volume to the subject, and Walter Savage
Landor, in his 'Imaginary Conversations,' gave us the since overworked
phrase 'delay of justice is injustice.'
"We are at death grips in America with this age-old problem of
government. Progress, gratifying progress, has been made. Let us
tighten our hold and go on until the history of our time will record
as its great achievement justice, sure and speedy, for all." The Cleteland

Bar Association Journal.
Colored Mammy-"Ah wants to see Judge Harding."
Oflce Boy-"Judge Harding is engaged."
Colored Mammy-"Ah don' want to marry him honey, Ah jus'
wants to see him."
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Taxes (Death) on Irrevocable Life Insurance -..........---------------------------------Hart, Stephen H --------.....
March, 1937
Taxepayer, The Reluctant --------------------------- Theobald, Robert A -----------May, 1938
Trusts-Federal Taxation of ---------------- Moylan, E. R --------....... --- February, 1938
Trust Drafting Contest ------------.........---...
Denver Clearing House BanksApril, 1937
Trust Drafting Contest ...............................-Denver Clearing House BanksMay, 1937
Trust Drafting Contest ---..........------------------ Denver Clearing House BanksJune, 1937
Unlawful Laws of Congress ----------------------- West Publishing Co--.......
December, 1937
Unlawful Practice of Law (In the Public
Interest) -....---....------------..----.......
.Boyle, Clark G .-- ....---------November, 1937
Voice From the Grave -------.----................
O'Neill, Christopher T ------May, 1938
Water Projects-Independence Pass Transmountain Diversion .
.
.
Bancroft, Frank N -----------March, 1937
Water Projects - State Control - Irrigated
Lands
_Lewis,
....
Hon. Lawrence.-.....
March, 1938
Water Projects-Transmountain DiversionsLewis, Hon. Lawrnce -----------June, 1937
Wills-Investment Clause-Preparation ----Kettering, Hon. C. E----------January, 1938

DICTA

OLD AGE FUND COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
Attention to the Old Age Fund was last invited on May
15, 1937.
Since then two very deserving cases came to our attention, which threatened greatly to deplete or wipe out our
balance but which were finally otherwise taken care of. One
or two members knew of these probable demands and offered
to respond to a call if additional funds became necessary.
To avoid an urgent call or "drive" for funds was one
of the purposes of establishing this Fund. Formerly when
cases of dire need arose they were ,overlooked or neglected
unless some friend made a hurried and sometimes unseemly
scramble for funds among the few who could be reached
quickly.
These embarrassing situations should be and will be
avoided if our members continue to make small contributions
annually or substantial ones occasionally.
Contributions have varied from one to one hundred
dollars, and each contributor is requested to remit to the
EDWARD RING,
Treasurer.
WILLIAM E. HUTTON,
Dated December 5, 1938. WILBUR F. DENIOUS, Trustees.
"RESOLVE NOW TO SAVE 10c OF EVERY $
THAT YOU EARN DURING 1939"

THE COLUMBIAN NATIONAL LIFE
INSURANCE CO.
BOSTON, MASS.
V. J. POBRISLO, General Agent

708-10 Ry. Exchange Bldg.
RECORD FROM LIFE

1

A Look
__

Ahead

__

Denver, Colorado

Ph. CH. 6521

At Age 65

Saved it-

I is wealthy

_and

100
MEN
AT
AGE
25

Kept it
Spent itor
Lost it

1

4 are well to do
5 Earn their own
living
54 are not self supporting
36 have died

